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WHY INVOKING THE

SCM

AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE A GOOD

RESPONSE TO CHINESE TEXTILES

Konstantina K. Athanasakout
I.

Introduction

The global trading system faces one of its most serious challenges with the
threat of China dominating the global textiles market as a result of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") textile quota expiration.' Textile import quotas
terminated on January 1, 2005, as required under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing ("ATC"). 2 Faced with the Chinese "800-pound gorilla,"' 3 the
United States and other developed countries are currently looking for ways to
foster competitiveness in their domestic textile and apparel industries. 4 In addithat the elimtion, several developing countries have raised concerns to the WTO
5
ination of textile quotas will stifle their economic development.
On the other hand, the People's Republic of China ("China"), which joined the
WTO in 2001,6 struggles with cooperating and functioning within the world trade
regime. Accused of subsidizing its textile and apparel industries, 7 the Chinese
government, as a good faith gesture, imposed a new tariff on local textiles on
t
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I David Barboza & Elizabeth Becker, China Rides New Surge In Export of Textiles,
TRIB.,

INT'L HERALD

Mar. 11, 2005, availableat http://www.iht.com/binlprintjipub.php?file=/Articles/2005/O3110/busi-

ness/trade.html; William R. Hawkins, The Geopolitical Challenge of Chinese Textile Exports, 5

CHINA

8 (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_005-008.pdf.
2 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter ATC].
3 See William Pesek, Jr., China is Global Economy's 800-pound Gorilla, THE MANILA TIMES, May
25, 2004, available at http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/may/25/yeheylbusiness/20040525bus7.
html.
BRIEF

4 See generally William C. Sjoberg & Carlos Moore, China Textile Safeguard: Process Effect, Tex-

tile World (2004), http://www.textileworld.com/News.htm?CD=2732&ID=8219 (examining current
United States trade considerations regarding imposing safeguards as a response to the threat of Chinese
textiles import surge); see also Global Alliance for Fair Textile Trade (GAFT), GlobalAlliance Presses
Governments and WTO to Halt Chinese Monopolization of Global Trade in Textiles and Clothing, (Jan.

26, 2005), http://www.amtacdc.org/pdf/050126gaftt.pdf [hereinafter GAFTT].
5 Daniel Pruzin & Christopher S. Rugaber, Textiles: WTO Members to Continue Talks on Proposal
to Examine Global Quota Elimination Impacts, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. 1620 (2004), available at http:ll

www.bna.con/itr/arch266.htm.
6 WTO Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Accession Agreement].
7 U.S.-CHINA EcONOMIC & SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, 108th
Congress, at 264 (Jun. 2004), http://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2004/04annual-report.pdf (stating that
China provides preferential access to loans to its manufacturers) [hereinafter 2004 REPORT]; Jonathan
Steiman, Expiration of Textile Quota Act Takes Toll on U.S. Manufacturers (Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.
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January 1, 2005.8 Further, the provisions of China's WTO Accession Agreement
allow for the imposition of limited safeguard measures to protect domestic markets from a Chinese textile import surge, 9 but these measures might not be sufficient to restrain China from taking over the world textiles market. 10 WTO
members are now looking at the WTO framework for ways to address the Chinese textile challenge presented with the expiration of the ATC. 11 The WTO
Agreements provide one possible solution: WTO countries could impose coununder the Agreement on Subtervailing duties to the subsidized Chinese imports
12
sidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM").
However, a country's ability to impose countervailing duties on textiles from
China under the WTO threatens the trading regime more seriously than the Chinese supremacy in textiles. Such an imposition poses a more substantial threat:
the impairment of the WTO free-trade system itself. The principle of comparative advantage lies at the heart of the WTO framework. 13 WTO countries, which
fear China's comparative advantage in textiles, can use countervailing measures
to combat that advantage under the guise of attacking subsidies. 14 However, the
imposition of countervailing duties to Chinese textiles within the WTO system
principle, the basic principle
will seriously undermine the comparative advantage
15
upon which the entire free-trade framework lies.
This article argues that although the WTO Agreements provide the possibility
to impose countervailing duties on subsidized Chinese textiles imported to a
WTO country, such countervailing measures can impair the free-trade system
itself and should be used sparingly. Part II presents the fundamental economic
concept of comparative advantage as it relates to the WTO free-trade system and
inc.com/criticalnews/articles/200501/textiles.html (quoting the representative of the American Manufacturing Coalition accusing China of subsidizing its textile industry).
8 Maurizio D'Orlando, Beijing Imposes Export Levies on Textiles After Export Quotas Are Abolished, ASIA NEWS, Jan. 7, 2005, available at http://www.asianews.it/view.php?l=en&art=2284.
9 See Accession Agreement, supra note 6, art. 16. (China's Accession Agreement includes a special
safeguard mechanism to prevent a surge of Chinese imports that remains in effect until 2013).
10 Zhou Yun, China to Gainfrom Textile Quota Expiry, CRI Online, Sept. 2, 2004, availableat http:/
/en.chinaradio.cn/1375/2004-9-2/35@148213.htm ("It is expected that the removal of restrictions will
make China the world's leading manufacturer of textiles and clothing by next year. In fact, the World
Trade Organization predicts that China alone will account for more than half of the worldwide textile
market by then").
11 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Deadlock on How to Address End of Textile Quotas, Pan Turkey's
Proposal, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. 1747 (2004).

12 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of Uruguay Round,
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter

SCM].
13 See Understanding the WTO: Basics-The Case for Open Trade, WTO Online, http://www.
wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/fact3-e.htm [hereinafter Understanding the WTO].
14 See SCM, supra note 12.
15 Typically, the imposition of WTO countervailing duties would not threaten comparative advantage
because countervailing duties are meant to offset trade-distorting behavior. However, the imposition of
countervailing duties in this case would distort comparative advantage, because although one can point to
some trade-distorting behavior, the injury caused by the Chinese surge of textile and apparel products
stems more directly from its comparative advantage and the removal of the trade-distorting textile quotas.
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provides an overview of the current concerns of WTO members regarding
China's textiles. Part III analyzes the application of the SCM on subsidized Chinese textiles, 16 and discusses the ability of the United States and other WTO
members to bring successful SCM actions against China. Part IV examines the
implications of imposing countervailing measures on Chinese textiles in light of
the comparative advantage principle and the termination of the textile quota system, suggesting that imposing such measures could undermine the entire WTO
framework.
II. Comparative Advantage, the Trading System, and the Problem With
Textiles
A.

Comparative Advantage

Comparative advantage theory lies at the heart of the free-trade system.' 7 The
WTO is a free-trade institution, predicated on a system of rules dedicated to
open, fair and undistorted competition. 18 The WTO embraces the idea that free
trade leads to economic growth, which in turn is based on the theory of comparative advantage.' 9 The theory of comparative advantage posits that countries
prosper first by taking advantage of their assets in order to concentrate on what
they can produce best, and then by trading these products for products that other
20
countries produce best.
The theory of comparative advantage is perhaps the most important concept in
international trade theory. 2 1 The original idea of comparative advantage dates to
the early nineteenth century. 22 Adam Smith, in support of free trade, wrote in
The Wealth of Nations, "If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity
cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of
the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some
advantage. '2 3 David Ricardo developed the model describing the theory of comparative advantage. 24 According to the "Ricardian Model," each country would
export goods in which it has a comparative advantage. 25 A country has a com16 See generally SCM, supra note 12.
17 See Understanding the WTO, supra note 13.
18 Understanding the WTO: Basics-Principlesof the Trading System, WTO Online, http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif
e/fact2_e.htm [hereinafter Principles of the Trading System].
19 See Understanding the WTO, supra note 13.
20 Id.; Steven Suranovic, The Theory of Comparative Advantage-Overview, Int'l Trade Theory &
Pol'y Lecture Notes (1997-2004), http://internationalecon.com/vl.0/ch40/40c000.htm.
21 See Suranovic, supra note 20; see generally Robert Howse, Symposium: The Boundaries of the
WTO: From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trade Regime, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 94 (2002).
22 See Suranovic, supra note 20.
23 Id. (quoting ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book IV, Section ii, 12).
24 See DAVID RiCARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (Prometheus Books
1996) (1817); see also Understanding the WTO, supra note 13.
25 See Suranovic, supra note 20.
In his example Ricardo imagined two countries, England and Portugal producing two goods,
cloth and wine, using labor as the sole input in production. He assumed that the productivity of
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parative advantage in the production of a good if it can produce the good at a
lower opportunity cost than another country. 26 That is, a nation has a comparative advantage in whichever good it sacrifices the least to produce.2 7 All countries, even the poorest ones, have assets (human power, industrial capabilities,
natural resources, financial capabilities, etc.) that they can employ to produce
goods and services for their domestic markets or to compete overseas. 28 Based
on the comparative advantage theory, it follows that a country should specialize
and trade in the good in which it is "most best" at producing or the good it is
"least worse" at producing.2 9 And with the stimulus of an open economy and
liberal trade policies, a country will experience the economic growth stemming
from fair competition. 30 The theory of comparative advantage lies at the core of
the WTO framework.

3

1

Comparative advantage provides the basis for a country's expectations of benefits from the WTO system.32 The WTO's creation on January 1, 1995 marked
the beginning of a new era in international trade. 33 The WTO Agreements cover
goods, services and intellectual property. 34 The Agreements include individual
country commitments to reduce tariffs and eliminate other trade barriers. 35 In
this framework, countries36 expect to experience economic growth from trading at
what they produce best.

labor (i.e., the quantity of output produced per worker) varied between industries and across
countries. .. Ricardo assumed that Portugal was more productive in both goods.
Id. He "demonstrated numerically that if England specialized in producing one of the two goods, and if
Portugal produced the other, then total world output of both goods could rise!" Then if England trades
with Portugal, "both countries could end up with more of both goods after specialization and free trade
than they each had before trade. This means that England may nevertheless benefit from free trade even
though it is assumed to be technologically inferior to Portugal in the production of the two goods."
26 See id. It is also important to distinguish between comparative advantage and absolute advantage.
A country has a comparative advantage in the production of a good if it can produce that good at a lower
opportunity cost relative to another country. A country has an absolute advantage in the production of a
good relative to another country if it can produce the good at lower cost or with higher productivity.
Absolute advantage compares industry productivities among countries. Id.
27 See id.
28

Understanding the WTO, supra note 13.

29

See Suranovic, supra note 20.

30
31

See Understandingthe WTO, supra note 13; see also RICARDO, supra note 24.
See Understandingthe WTO, supra note 13.

32

See

RICARDO,

supra note 24; see also Understandingthe WTO, supra note 13.

See Understanding the WTO: Basics-The Uruguay Round, WTO Online, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact5_e.htm (noting that the Uruguay Round, that resulted in the creation
of the WTO, brought about the biggest reform of the world's trading system since the GATT) [hereinafter The Uruguay Round].
33

34 Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARiz. J.
COMP. L. 257, 269-70 (2000); see The Uruguay Round, supra note 33.

NT'L

&

35 See generally Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble (Apr. 15, 1994);
see also Principles of the Trading System, supra note 18.
36 See Understanding the WTO, supra note 13.
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However, the WTO benefits for textile-producing countries are currently in
flux because of the expiration of the ATC 37 and the resulting uncertainty in the
textiles and apparel market. Countries which are best at producing textiles or
apparel hope to benefit from the elimination of all quotas with the expiration of
the ATC. However, the accession of China into the WTO changed the dynamic
between the countries competing in the trade of textiles. The introduction of
such a large player in the competition gave rise to fears of a Chinese take-over of
the world trade in textiles, especially after the expiration of the ATC. 38 Uncertainty regarding the benefits of free trade replaced the initial optimism for economic growth based on the principle of comparative advantage.
International Trade in Textiles

B.

Textiles comprise a very significant part of international trade. In 2003, trade
in textiles amounted to C 395 billion, nearly 6% of world exports. 39 The textiles
and apparel sector plays a major role in the economies of industrialized countries
and is particularly important for developing and least-developed countries. 40 Not
surprisingly, as it was in the former General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
41
("GATT") system, trade in textiles is one of the contentious issues in the WTO.
The textiles trade has been the subject of extensive negotiations between trading countries. Until the Uruguay Round, textile and clothing quotas were negotiated bilaterally under the rules of the Multifibre Arrangement ("MFA"). 42 The
MFA provided for the application of selective qualitative restrictions when
surges in imports of particular products caused, or threatened to cause, serious
damage to the domestic industry of the importing country. 43 These restrictions
departed from the GATT non-discrimination principle because they specified
how much the importing country would accept from individual exporting countries. 44 The MFA shaped the pattern of production in garment and textiles by
45
binding countries to maximum export quotas for specific product categories.
On January 1, 1995, after seven years of complex negotiations, the MFA was
37 See ATC, supra note 2, art. 9 (ATC expired on January 1, 2005, eliminating all quotas in textiles.
Consequently, importing countries whose domestic textile industries are threatened by increased imports
cannot place quotas to limit imports).
38 Barboza & Becker, supra note 1.
39 Textiles-What's New, http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/textiles/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).

40 See Textiles-What's New, supra note 39; Commission of the European Communities, Evolution
of Trade in Textile and Clothing Worldwide-Trade Figures and Structural Data, 6-7 (Working docu-

ment No. DG TRADE E.1/12835, 2003); see also K. M. Chandrasekhar, Chairman, ITCB, Presentation
at EC Conference on the Future of Textiles and Clothing after 2004, May 5, 2003, available at http://
trade-info.cec.eu.int/textiles/documents/142.pdf.
41

Understanding the WTO: Textiles-Back in the Mainstream, WTO Online, http://www.wto.org/

english/thewto e/whatis e/tif-e/agrm5e.htm [hereinafter Textiles-Back in the Mainstream].
42 Id.
43

Id.

44

Id.

45 See Clean Clothes Campaign, The Phase-Out of the Multifiber Arrangement, http://www.clean-

clothes.org/publications/04-04-somo.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
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replaced by the ATC, which set out a ten-year transitional process for the ulti46
mate removal of the quotas.
The ATC was built on the following key elements: (a) product coverage encompassing yams, fabrics, made-up textile products and clothing; 47 (b) a program for the progressive integration of these textile and clothing products into
GATT 1994 rules; 48 (c) a liberalization process to progressively enlarge existing
49
quotas (until they are removed) by increasing annual growth rates at each stage;
(d) a special safeguard mechanism to deal with new cases of serious damage or
threat thereof to domestic producers during the transition period;50 (e) establishment of a Textiles Monitoring Body ("TMB") to supervise the implementation of
the Agreement and ensure that the rules are faithfully followed; 5 1 and (f) other
provisions, including rules on circumvention of the quotas, their administration,
treatment of non-MFA restrictions, and commitments undertaken elsewhere
under WTO Agreements and procedures affecting this sector.52 The ATC and all
its market access restrictions terminated on January 1, 2005. 53 Therefore, the
general rules and disciplines embodied in the multilateral free-trade system now
54
govern trade in textiles and apparel.
Given the importance of textiles for world trade and the entrance into a new
era of trade in textiles after the expiration of the ATC, the global textile and
apparel industries have legitimate concerns for the future.55 The elimination of
all quotas raised questions as to whether the smaller national textile industries
can compete against larger national textile industries that can more quickly produce and distribute larger quantities of textile products at lower costs.5 6 The
main concern of WTO members is that unfair trade practices, like subsidization,
will enhance the capabilities of some of the larger textile manufacturing
57
countries.
46 See id.; see also Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB)-The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, http:/
/www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/textie/texintroe.htm.
47 See ATC, supra note 2, arts. 1.7 & 2.6, Annex (stating the textile and clothing products to which
ATC applied).
48 See id. arts. 1.5 & 2.6 (noting the goal of increased openness in the textile markets).
49 See id. arts. 2.13 & 2.14 (enumerating the stages of the agreement and the pertinent growth rates).
50 See id. art. 6 (providing a safeguard mechanism during the transition period when there is serious
damage or threat of serious damage to the domestic industry for like or directly competitive products).
51 See id. art. 8 (noting the establishment of the TMB and its role).
52 See generally id. arts. 1-2 & 5 (stating the goals, procedures, and administration of the ATC).
53 Id. art. 9 (providing specifically that the duration of the ATC will be 121 months and after its
expiration the textiles sector will be integrated into the GATT 1994 general framework).
54 Textile-Back in the Mainstream, supra note 41 (noting that the WTO principles of most favored
nation and national treatment are applicable to textiles after the ATC expiration); see also Textile Industry's WTO Commitments, CHINA DAILY ONLINE, http://bizchina.chinadaily.com.cn/guide/industry/industry9-03.htm (discussing that according to China's WTO commitments, the average duty of textiles
apparel should be reduced by 17.8 percent, 15.2 percent and 11.4 percent respectively from 2002 to

2005).
55 Barboza & Becker, supra note 1.
56 See GAFMT, supra note 4.
57 See id.
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This subsidization concern is particularly acute with respect to China. 58 China
joined the WTO in 2001 after extensive negotiations. 59 WTO members wanted
to ensure that China would commit to making changes toward a market economy
in order to participate in the free-trade system. 60 In joining the free-trade system,
China committed to the elimination
of its subsidies, including subsidies to the
6
textiles and apparel industry. '
C.

Textiles and the China Accession Agreement

The Accession Agreement of China addresses the concerns of the United
States and other WTO members with respect to China's WTO accession. 62 Specifically, Article 16 provides for "Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Measures."' 63 These measures are available when Chinese origin imports cause or
threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like or directly
competitive products of any WTO member. 64 A country can impose safeguards
65
only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy such market disruption.
66
Also, these measures are limited in duration. Under this framework, the United
States can only apply safeguards to specific textile products renewable annually
for three years following a new determination that the market disruption
67
persists.
However, the China Accession Agreement may not address all the potential
problems of a domestic industry confronted with a surge of Chinese textile imports. Under the Accession Agreement, an individual country can respond to a
disruption of its domestic market by imposing safeguard measures on the imports
at issue. 6 8 The country must assess (a) whether there is an import surge of a
specific textile article, and (b) whether the increased imports of the article in
question cause or threaten to cause a disruption of the domestic textile market in
like or directly competitive products. 69 In the United States, in response to the
58 Id.
59 JINGzHou TAO & DiARMtLmu O'BRiEN, NON-TARIFF TRADE BARRIERS IN CHINA, XXX-XXXiV, 144

(Sweet & Maxwell Asia 2003); See Thomas Rumbaugh & Nicolas Blancher, China: InternationalTrade
and WTO Accession (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/04/36, 2004), available at http://
www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0436.pdf.
60 Id; See Hai Wen, The WTO and China's Objectives as a World Trading Power (June 1997), http://
finance.sina.com.cn/d/20040611/1307809441 .shtml (describing China's efforts to join the world trade
system that led to its accession to the WTO).
61 See Rumbaugh & Blancher, supra note 59, at 8.
62 See generally Accession Agreement, supra note 6.
63 Accession Agreement, supra note 6, art. 16.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Michael Hutchinson, Dir. of the U.S. Dep't of Commerce's Office of Textiles and Apparel
Michael Hutchinson, Address at the Organization of Women in International Trade January Meeting
(Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Trade Address].
67 Id.
68 See Accession Agreement, supra note 6, art. 16.
69 Id.
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expiration of the ATC, the domestic textile industry sought to impose safeguards
on increased imports from China. 70 The U.S. Department of Commerce received
many requests and is currently under pressure to impose safeguards on several
Chinese textile articles. 71 To further complicate matters, in addressing the requirements for imposing safeguards on textile products, the U.S. Court of International Trade ("CIT") recently questioned the ability to control Chinese textile
imports under the Accession Agreement safeguard provisions. 72 The CIT held
that a threat of market disruption is insufficient to impose safeguards, and instead
required a finding of actual market disruption.7 3 Regardless of what happened on
appeal,74 the CIT decision reflects the domestic textile industry's concerns regarding the appropriate reactions to the surge of Chinese textile imports following the expiration of the ATC.
Moreover, China's questionable progress towards the elimination of its textile
subsidies accentuates the uncertainty surrounding China's role in the world textile market following the expiration of all textile quotas. China's enormous capacity to produce and distribute textiles, accompanied by suspicion of
subsidization, has intensified the fears of other WTO countries about the future
of their own domestic industries. 75 In this setting, developed countries, like the
United States, face declining domestic textile industries and limited means under
China's Accession Agreement to protect them against a Chinese "textile invasion." At the same time, developing countries encounter the possibility of forcing the shutdown of their domestic textile industries, while lacking alternative
means for economic development. 76 Consequently, WTO countries will look for
stronger responses to their concerns and the most appropriate place to start is the
WTO framework itself.
III.

Applying WTO Countervailing Duties to China's Textiles

The WTO does provide its members with ways to deal with a surge of imported textiles from China. This part will demonstrate that a country alleging
subsidization in the form of preferential access to credit may successfully invoke
70 Hutchinson, Trade Address, supra note 66; see also List of 2005 Requests for China Textile Safeguard Action, http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/Requests-filedby-industry.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
71 Id.; See Safeguard Category Embargo Information, http:lwww.customs.gov/xp/cgov/import/textiles and-quotas/china/safeguard embargos -.article.xml (on January 25, 2005, the United States had in
place only one safeguard on socks from China. However, currently there are ten categories of established
import restraints on textiles from China).
72 See U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textile & Apparel v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1342
(CIT 2004).
73 Id.
74 See U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textile & Apparel v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 413 F.3d 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has lifted the preliminary injunction issued
by the U.S. Court of International Trade that barred the imposition of new limits on imported textile and
apparel products from China. The injunction had prevented the Committee for the Implementation of
Textile Agreements (CITA) from considering twelve safeguard petitions filed in 2004 from U.S. textile

manufacturers).
75
76
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the provisions of the SCM to address its suspicions of Chinese subsidization.
The Chinese textile industry's preferential access to loans may be an actionable
subsidy in violation of China's WTO obligations under the SCM. 77 Consequently, a challenging country could force China to change its unfair trade practices or could impose
measures in retaliation for China's failure to abide by its
78
WTO obligations.
A.

The SCM Provisions

1.

Finding a Subsidy

The SCM Agreement controls the use of specific subsidies and regulates actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. 79 According to the
SCM provisions, a country can use the WTO's dispute settlement procedures to
seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its adverse effects. 80 In the
alternative, a WTO member can launch its own investigation and ultimately
charge an extra duty ("countervailing duty") on subsidized imports that harm
domestic producers. 8 '
Article 1.1 of the SCM defines what constitutes a subsidy. There are three
elements that all must be present for a subsidy to exist: (1) a financial contribution (2) by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (3)
which confers a benefit.8 2 Financial contributions for SCM purposes include
grants, loans, equity infusions, loan guarantees, fiscal incentives, the provision of
goods or services, and the purchase of goods. 83 Government and public bodies
include not only national governments, but also sub-national governments and
public bodies such as state-owned companies. 84 Determining the existence of a
85
benefit is very clear if there is a cash grant, and thus a direct transfer of funds,
77 SCM, supra note 12.

Id.
Id. arts. 2 & 3 (article 2 narrows the scope of the SCM by stating that the SCM applies only to
specific and not general subsidies. General subsidies are strictly prohibited under the WTO framework.
A "Specific" subsidy is one available only to an enterprise, industry, group of enterprises, or group of
industries in the country (or state, etc) that gives the subsidy. Additionally, specific subsidies can be
domestic or export subsidies).
80 Id. arts. 4 & 7 (stating the remedies available to WT'O countries under the SCM).
81 See SCM, supra note 12, arts. 9, 17 & 19 (noting the availability of procedures for consultations,
provisional CVD measures, and collection of countervailing duties).
82 Id. art. 1 (providing the definition of subsidy and giving examples).
78
79

83

Id. Panel Report, Korea-MeasuresAffecting Trade In Commercial Vessels,

7.120-7.126, 7.25-

7.35, WT/DS273/R (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanelsfull/korea-vessels(panel)(full).pdf (the Panel held that the loans and loan guarantees at issue fell under Article
1.1(a)(1)(i) and rejected Korea's argument that this provision covers only "government practices," which
do not apply to functions normally performed by banks. The Panel accepted the European Communities
argument that the APRG program "provides for a 'potential direct transfer of funds' within the meaning
of Article 1.1(a)(1)(i).") [hereinafter Korea-Commercial Vessels].
84 See id., supra note 83,
7.49-7.50.
85 Panel Report, Canada-MeasuresAffecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 1[ 9.306, WT/DS70/R
(Apr. 14, 1999), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanelsfullcanada-aircraft(panel)
(full).pdf (the dispute Panel noted that the TPC contributions constituted "financial contributions" by a
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but not all benefits are so easily discernible. 86 Article 14 of the SCM Agreement
provides some guidance with respect to determining whether certain types of
measures confer a benefit, however, it does not provide complete guidance as to
the meaning of "benefit. '87 In Canada-Aircraft,the WTO Appellate Body provided clarification when it found that the existence of a benefit should be determined by comparison with the marketplace (i.e., on the basis of what the
recipient could have received in the market).8 8
The SCM Agreement divides specific subsidies into two categories: prohibited
and actionable (i.e., subject to challenge in the WTO or to countervailing measures). 89 According to Article 2 of the SCM, all specific subsidies fall into one
of these categories. 90
Further, Article 3.1 provides two categories of prohibited subsidies: (1) "subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance" (export subsidies), and (2) "subsidies
contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of
domestic over imported goods" (local content subsidies). 91 These subsidies are
strictly prohibited by Article 3.2 of the SCM.92 Thus, a WTO member can challenge prohibited subsidies and impose countervailing measures, as provided
under Article 4.93
public body within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, as they were direct transfers of
funds from the government of Canada, as required by Article 1.1(a)(1)(i).) [hereinafter CanadaAircraft].
86 In Korea-Commercial Vessels, the Panel rejected the European Communities' allegations of subsidization and found that "although certain provisions of the KLR might indicate that its was intended as
a means of providing subsidies, a conclusion that the KLR could be applied in a manner that confers a
benefit would not be a sufficient basis to conclude that the KLR as such is mandatory legislation susceptible of inconsistency with Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement." See Korea-CommercialsVessels, supra
note 83,
7.68-7.107.
87 Id.

149-161,
88 Appellate Body Report, Canada-MeasuresAffecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds70
_e.htm (follow "Appellate Body Report" hyperlink) (Affirming the Panel's finding of the definition of a
benefit under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body said that "a benefit places the
recipient in a more advantageous position that would have been the case but for the financial contribution"); Panel Report, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead
6.22-6.86, WT/DSI38/R
and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom,
(Dec. 23, 2005), available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/WTOP/l999/7.html (moreover, in U.S.Lead Bars, the Panel said that because fair market value was paid for all productive assets, goodwill etc.,
it could not see how the "financial contributions" given to the original company could confer a "benefit"
on the latter companies.) [hereinafter U.S.-Lead Bars].
89 Understandingthe WTO, supra note 13.
90 SCM, supra note 12, art. 2 (stating that "a subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located
within a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be specific"
and that "any subsidy falling under the provision of Article 3 shall be deemed to be specific").
91 Id. art. 3.1 (listing the types of prohibited subsidies under the SCM).
92 Id. art. 3.2 (stating that "a Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to in paragraph 1" of Article 3, namely export or local content subsidies).
93 Id. art. 4 (specifying the remedies available to a Member challenging a prohibited subsidy granted
or maintained by another WTO country).
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Actionable subsidies are a member's subsidies that cause adverse effects to the
interests of other WTO members. 94 Article 5 of the SCM enumerates three types
of adverse effects that may be at issue in an SCM challenge. 95 First, an adverse
effect may be an "injury to the domestic industry of another member" caused by
subsidized imports in the territory of the complaining country. 96 Injury in the

domestic market of the adversely affected WTO country is the sole basis for
applying countervailing measures. 97 A second type of adverse effect is "serious
prejudice to the interests of another member. '9 8 Serious prejudice usually arises
as a result of adverse effects (i.e., export displacement) in the market of the subsidizing country or in a third country market. 99 Thus, unlike injury, it can serve
as the basis for a complaint related to harm to a member's export interests. In
other words, in a serious prejudice claim, the increased imports cause harm not
on the domestic market of the complaining country but on its export interests.100
Article 6 provides additional provisions regarding what constitutes serious
prejudice within the context of Article 5(c). 1 0 1 Article 6.1 lists four types of

subsidies where serious prejudice may exist: (1) certain ad valorem subsidization, (2) subsidies to cover industry operating losses, (3) subsidies to cover enterprise operating losses, and (4) direct debt forgiveness.10 2 Furthermore, for
serious prejudice to exist within the context of Article 5(c), an Article 6.1 subsidy
must result in one or several of the effects enumerated in Article 6.3.103 Article
6.3 provides that serious prejudice results when the subsidy displaces or impedes
the imports or exports of another member in the subsidizing country's market or
04
in a third market, or when the subsidy results in loss of sales or market share.1
94 Id. art. 5 (noting that no member should cause, through the use of subsidies, adverse effects to the
interests of other WTO members and enumerating those adverse effects).
95 Id.
96 Id.

97 See id. art. 5, n. 11 & art. 19.

98 Id. art. 5; see also Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
7.1494-7.1495,
WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/267r-a_e.pdf
(holding that "threat" of serious prejudice refers to something distinct from "serious prejudice," but that
"serious prejudice" is "necessarily including the concept of 'threat' and exceeding the presence of 'threat'
for purposes of answering the relevant inquiry") [hereinafter U.S.-Upland Cotton].
99 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 6.3 (enumerating the situations where serious prejudice in the sense
of Article 5(c) may exist).
100 See SCM; see also U.S.-Upland Cotton.
101 SCM, supra note 12, art. 6 (delineating the situations when serious prejudice will be deemed to
exist under the SCM Agreement).
102 Id. art. 6.1.
103 Id. art. 6.2 (stating that "notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, serious prejudice shall not
be found if the subsidizing Member demonstrates that the subsidy in questions has not resulted in any of
the effects enumerated in paragraph 3").
104 Id. art. 6.3. Art. 6.3 provides:
S]erious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in any case where one or
several of the following apply: (a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports
of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; (b) the effect of
the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like product of another Member from a third
country market; (c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized
product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or
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A third type of adverse effect listed in Article 5 is nullification or impairment
of benefits accruing under GATT 1994.105 Nullification or impairment arises
most typically when subsidization undercuts the improved market access presumed to flow from a bound tariff reduction. 10 6 Unlike injuries to the domestic
market or to export interests, under a nullification or impairment classification,
the injury is to the country's anticipated benefits from the better market access.
Article 7 provides the remedies available to a WTO country alleging one or
more Article 5 adverse effects. 10 7 Specifically, Article 7 provides for initial consultations between interested parties. 10 8 However, if consultations do not produce a mutually satisfying result, the parties may refer the dispute to the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). to° If the DSB makes an affirmative determination that an actionable subsidy exists, the member providing the subsidy must
withdraw it or eliminate its adverse effects.1 10 If the subsidizing member fails to
do so, the complaining country may impose countervailing measures. 1 '
Therefore, a WTO country may use the SCM Agreement to protect its industry
against prohibited and actionable subsidies. Prohibited subsidies must be immediately withdrawn according to Article 4.112 Actionable subsidies carry a more
demanding burden of proof since the challenging country must prove the existence of one or more of the adverse effects of Article 5.113 However, if the
challenger meets its burden of proof, it can use the remedial provisions of Article
14
7 to remove the subsidy's adverse effects or impose countervailing measures.'
2. Special and Differential Treatmentfor TransitionalEconomies and
Developing Countries
Recognizing that subsidies may play an important role for countries in the
process of transforming to a market economy, the SCM Agreement provides
members undergoing the transition with special and differential treatment under
Article 29.115 Article 29.1 provides that "members in the process of transformasignificant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market; (d) the effect of
the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing Member in a particular
subsidized primary product or commodity as compared to the average share it had during the
previous period of three years and this increase follows a consistent trend over a period when
subsidies have been granted.
105 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 5(b) (stating when nullification or impairment will be deemed to
occur).
106 Id.
107 Id. art. 7.
108See id.arts. 7.1-7.3. (stating the remedies available for WTO countries when they successfully
show injury to their domestic industry, nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice under the SCM).
109 See id. arts. 7.4-7.7.
110 See id. art. 7.8.
IIISee id. arts. 7.9-7.10.
112 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 4.
113 See id. arts. 4-7 & 19.
114 See id. art. 7.
115 Id.art. 29.
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tion from a centrally-planned into a market, free-enterprise economy may apply
programmes and measures necessary for such transformation." ' 16 Under Article
29.2, members have a seven-year period from the date of entry into the WTO to
phase out export or local content subsidies that have been deemed prohibited
under Article 3 and that have been notified as required under article 29.3.117
During this seven-year period, subsidies falling under Article 6.1, granted in the
form of direct debt forgiveness or grants to cover debt repayment, are not actionable.11 8 In addition, Article 29.4 provides that in exceptional circumstances the
member in transition may depart from its notification program, if such departure
is necessary for the process of transformation into a market economy.1 19 For all
other actionable subsidies that are not explicitly provided for under Article 29,
1 20
Article 29.2(b) states that Article 27.9 applies.
Article 27 is part of the SCM provisions regarding developing countries. It
confers special and differential treatment to developing WTO countries in recognition of the role that subsidies play in their economic development.1 21 Article
29.2(b) expressly refers to the provisions of Article 27.9, which, in turn, provides
that
[R]egarding actionable subsidies granted or maintained by a developing
country Member other than those referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6,
action may not be authorized or taken under Article 7 unless nullification
or impairment of tariff concessions or other obligations under GATT
1994 is found to exist as a result of such subsidy, in such a way as to
displace or impede imports of a like product of another Member into the
market of the subsidizing developing country Member or unless injury to
a domestic industry in the market of an importing Member occurs. 122

116

Id. art. 29.1.

117

Id. art. 29.2, stating that:

[flor such Members, subsidy programmes falling within the scope of Article 3, and notified
according to paragraph 3, shall be phased out or brought into conformity with Article 3 within a
period of seven years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. In such a case,
Article 4 shall not apply
See also id. art. 29.3, explaining that:
[s]ubsidy programmes falling within the scope of Article 3 shall be notified to the Committee by
the earliest practicable date after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Further
notifications of such subsidies may be made up to two years after the date of entry into force of
the WTO Agreement.
118 See id. arts. 6.1 & 29.2.
119 Id. art. 29.4 (noting that "[iln exceptional circumstances Members referred to in paragraph 1 may
be given departures from their notified programmes and measures and their time-frame by the Committee
if such departures are deemed necessary for the process of transformation").
120 Id. art. 29.2(b) (providing that "[wlith respect to other actionable subsidies, the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 27 shall apply").
121 SCM, supra note 12, art. 27 (stating that the SCM provides for special provision for subsidies
granted by developing countries).
122 Id. arts. 27.9 & 29.2(b).
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Additionally, Article 27.13 may be applicable as it refers to the same type of
subsidies enumerated in Article 29.123 Specifically, Article 27.13 states that direct forgiveness of debt and subsidies to cover social costs in whatever form will
not be actionable subsidies under the SCM when they are linked to the privatization program of the developing country, have limited duration, and are

notified. 124
Thus, the provisions of Article 29 concerning transitioning economies and
those of Article 27 regarding developing countries protect the subsidies of the
WTO members that meet certain criteria.1 25 Accordingly, China's alleged textile
subsidies may be protected under the provision of Articles 27 and 29, as China 12is,6
arguably, both a non-market economy in transition and a developing country.
B.

Applying the SCM Provisions to Chinese Textile Subsidies

1.

Subsidy

China currently has subsidies that could be actionable under the SCM Agreement but for Article 29. China provides subsidies in the forms of grants and tax
forgiveness, assistance by local budget, preferential tariff rates, tax and tariff re128
funds.127 These subsidies are actionable subsidies under Article 6 of the SCM.
In addition, China provides loans contingent on export performance, which are
prohibited subsidies under SCM Article 3.129 China, however, is currently in
protransition toward becoming a market economy, and Article 29 of the SCM
130
tects any reported subsidy programs that would facilitate its transition.
As discussed above, Article 29 explicitly protects transitioning economies
from WTO actions in relation to (a) notified prohibited subsidies under Article 3
and (b) notified actionable subsidies under article 6. 1(d).1 3 1 Article 29 evinces a
WTO policy concern for the transformation of non-market economies into free
123 Id. arts. 27.13 & 29.

124 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 27.13. Article 27.13 states:
The provisions of Part IMishall not apply to direct forgiveness of debts, subsidies to cover social
costs, in whatever form, including relinquishment of government revenue and other transfer of

liabilities when such subsidies are granted within and directly linked to a privatization programme of a developing country Member, provided that both such programme and the subsidies
involved are granted for a limited period and notified to the Committee and that the programme
results in eventual privatization of the enterprise concerned.
125 See supra Part II.A.2.
126 See

id.

127 See Accession Agreement, supra note 6, at Annex 5A, 5B (reporting the subsidies currently in
place in China, which will eventually be eliminated).
128 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 6.
129 Id.art. 3.1.

130 See id. art. 29; see also Accession Agreement, supra note 6, at Annex 5A, 5B (in its WTO Accession Agreement, the Chinese government notified the textiles subsidy programs it currently has in place
but will phase-out as China transforms itself into a market economy).
131 See supra Part II.A.2.
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market ones; 132 it is clearly intended to allow transition-economy members extra
flexibility in using subsidies to achieve their economic reform. 133 China is a
WTO member in the process of transformation to a market economy and its
textile subsidies may fall squarely within the provisions of Article 29.134 Consequently, Article 29 may preclude a35 WTO member from invoking the SCM
against subsidized Chinese textiles.1
However, Article 29 does not constitute an absolute ban on actions against
subsidization maintained by a transitioning economy. It grants protection to specific types of subsidies, which must be reported, or when "critical circumstances"
necessitate subsidization to help the transition into a market economy.136 Arguably, Article 29 does not preclude a WTO country from seeking remedies for
those subsidies that do not meet the requirements of Article 29. Such "unprotected" subsidies will be (a) present absent any "critical circumstances" and without their notification, and (b) of a type other than those explicitly provided for
137
under Article 29, including preferential access to loans.
According to Article 1 of the SCM, preferential access to loans would be a
subsidy because it is an indirect financial contribution by a public body. 138 It is
more likely than not that the Chinese government will be involved one way or
another in the preferential treatment of its textile producers, since China is not yet
132 The trend toward globalization and liberalization of the world economy exerts great pressure on
developing countries. See The WTO in Brief: Trade and Development, WTO Online, http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto e/whatise/inbriefe/inbr04_e.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). The WTO regime recognizes the difficulties developing non-market countries may encounter in their transformation into market economies and provides a range of measures in support of their adjustment process.
All WTO agreements contain special provision for [developing countries], including longer time
periods to implement agreements and commitments, measures to increase their trading opportunities, provisions requiring all WTO members to safeguard their trade interests, and support to
help them build the infrastructure for WTO work, handle disputes, and implement technical
standards.
Id.
133 Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOES)-A CriticalAppraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 7 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 863, 868 (2004).
134 If the transition economy is also a developing country, such programs and measures may also be
exempted under Article 27.13 of the SCM as subsidies to assist privatization. See SCM, supra note 12,
art. 27.13. The exception provided by Article 29 is broader in scope than Article 27.13, but is limited to
the seven-year period. See id. Consequently, the provisions of Article 27 also apply to China's subsidies, because China is a developing country. See id. art. 27. However, Article 27.13 will not apply to
Chinese subsidies in the form of preferential access to loans, because this type of subsidy is not provided
for in the language of Article 27.13. See id. art. 27.13. Article 27.13 would still not apply even if the
Chinese textile subsidies at issue were provided for in its text, because China's Accession Agreement
does not include such form of textile subsidies in its notification reports as required under this article.
See id. Lastly, unlike Article 29.4, Article 27.13 does not allow departures from the Member-notified
programs. See SCM, supra note 12, art 27.13.
135 See id. art. 29.
136 See supra Part III.A.2.
137

Id.; see also 2004

REPORT,

supra note 7, at 263-64.

See SCM, supra note 12, art. 1; see also Panel Report, Canada-ExportCredits and Loan Guarantees for RegionalAircraft, [ 7.66, 7.141-7.142, WT/DS222/R (Jan. 28, 2002) available at http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanelsfull/canada-aircraftll(panel)(full).pdf
(finding that if the various
measures at issue involve "direct" or "potential direct" transfers of funds, they are financial contributions
within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM) [hereinafter Canada-AircraftI1].
138
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a market economy. 139 In addition, the government has a stake in the control of
most of the Chinese financial institutions. 140 The Chinese banks involved are not
completely4 independent and therefore constitute public bodies for SCM
purposes.1 '
Moreover, preferential access to loans is an indirect financial contribution according to the SCM provisions. A loan is by definition a transfer of funds, in this
case, to the textile and apparel factories. 142 Preference in granting a loan is an
indirect transfer of funds and, thus, an indirect financial contribution that confers
a financial advantage, or benefit, to the Chinese textile industry in relation to its
market position prior to the financial contribution. 143 According to the holding
of Canada-Aircraft,the financial contribution conferred to the Chinese apparel
and textile factories places them in a more advantageous position in the world
market than would have been the case but for the financial contribution. 144 Chinese textile and apparel industries benefit from having preferential access to
credit.' 4 5 Such benefit meets the third element of the SCM subsidy definition
and, consequently,
completes the requirements for a subsidy under Article 1 of
14 6
the SCM.
A subsidy in the form of preferential access to loans is not a prohibited subsidy under Article 3 and, thus, it does not fall under the protective provisions of
Article 29.2.147 According to Article 3 of the SCM, the subsidy is strictly prohibited if it is solely, or as one of several conditions, contingent on export performance. 148 Likewise, if the subsidy is contingent upon the use of domestic over
imported goods, either solely or as one of several other conditions, it is strictly
prohibited. 149 As shown earlier, Article 29.2 prevents WTO action against reported Article 3 subsidies. 150 Since preferential access to loans does not have
any conditions attached to it, this is not an export subsidy or a local content
subsidy.' 5 ' Consequently, preferential access to loans will not be a prohibited
139 See id. See generally Accession Agreement, supra note 6, sec. 15. Unlike the United States, some
countries recognize China as a market economy. China's Accession Agreement provides for such market
economy treatment in Section 15.
140 See Pesek, supra note 3.
141 See id.

142 See OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS (Amer. ed. 1997).
143 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 1; see also Canada-AircraftH, supra note 138, IT 7.66, 7.1417.142,
144 See Canada Aircraft, supra note 88,
9.306-9.307.
145 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 1; see also Canada-AircraftII, supra note 138, IT 7.66 & 7.1417.142,
146 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 1.
147 See SCM, supra note 12, arts. 3 & 29.2.
148 See id. art. 3.1.
149 See id. art. 3.2.
150 See SCM, supra note 117.
151 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 3. n.4 (stating that an export subsidy must be "in fact tied to actual or
anticipated exportation or export earnings").
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subsidy under Article 3 of the SCM, and thus it does not fall under the protective
provisions of Article 29.2.152
Moreover, Article 29.3 does not apply because preferential access to loans is
not an Article 3 subsidy. 153 Article 29.3 provides for the reporting of Article 3
subsidies. 154 Therefore, the preamble and paragraph (a) of Article 29.2 and Artiaction against China's preferential access to loans for
cle 29.3 would not prevent
5
its textile industry.15
Also, preferential access to loans is not a subsidy within the scope of Article
6.1(d) of the SCM and is not a subsidy protected under Article 29.2(a). 1 56 Article
6.1 explicitly provides for "direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt, and grants to cover debt repayment."' 157 As shown earlier, Article 29.2(a) prohibits WTO action against subsidies expressly provided for under
Article 6.1(d). 158 Preferential access to loans is neither debt forgiveness nor a
grant to cover debt repayment, and thus it is not a subsidy within the meaning of
Article 6.1(d). Consequently, preferential access to loans is not explicitly prohib59
ited under Article 6. 1(d), nor is it a subsidy protected under Article 29.2(a).1
Alternatively, even if preferential access to loans were either a prohibited subsidy under Article 3 or a subsidy within the scope of Article 6.1 (d), it would not
be protected by Article 29.2 because it has not been reported. 160 China's Accession Agreement includes a commitment to eliminate trade barriers and provide
subsidy notification reports.' 6 1 While China's subsidy notifications report preferential loan treatment for the Chinese automobile industry, they do not report
any preferential loan treatment for the textile industry. 162 The provisions of Article 29.2 require the notification of subsidy programmes falling within the scope
of either Article 3 or Article 6.1(d) and provide for their prospective elimination. 163 Accordingly, preferential access to loans would not fall within the protective provisions of Article 29.2 because China has not met the notification
requirement. Therefore, the preamble and paragraph (a) of Article 29.2 do not
apply to Chinese textile subsidies in the form of preferential access to credit
because these subsidies do not fall under the provisions of either Article 3 or
Article 6.1 (d). 164
152 Id.

153Because it is not a subsidy under Article 3, it does not fall under 29.3, which provides for article 3
subsidies. Id. art. 29.3.
154 Id.

155Id.arts. 29.2 & 29.3.
156 See id.
157 Id.
158

See id.

159 See SCM, supra note 12, arts. 6.1 & 29.2.

See supra note 117.
Accession Agreement, supra note 6, at Annex 5A, 5B.
162 Id.
163 SCM, supra note 12, art. 29.2.
160
161

164

Id.
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However, in a potential challenge, China may argue that preferential access to
credit for its textile producers is necessary for the economy's transformation
under Article 29.1 or Article 29.4. Article 29.1 allows WTO members to apply
subsidy programs necessary for the transition to a free market economy. 16 5 Thus,
China must show that the subsidization of its textile industry through preferential
access to loans is necessary for its transition to a market economy. This is a high
burden to meet, given that China has already committed to eliminate all subsidies
and reported in its Accession Agreement those subsidies necessary for the transi166
tion to a market economy that will be gradually phased out.
Similarly, by invoking Article 29.4, China may argue that critical market conditions dictate the subsidization of its textile industry in the form of preferential
access to loans. 16 7 Article 29.4 provides that in exceptional circumstances, a
WTO member in transition may depart from its notification program, if such
68
departure is necessary for the process of transforming into a market economy.
In order to succeed under this defense, China will have to show the presence of
exceptional circumstances in order to justify departure from its notified subsidy
programs. Also, it will have to show that preferential access to loans for Chinese
textile manufacturers is necessary under these circumstances.1 69 Consequently,
China has a high burden of proof regarding a potential defense pursuant to Article 29.4.
Arguably, China will most likely be unsuccessful in invoking either Article
29.1 or Article 29.4 as a defense. It took fifteen years of extensive negotiations
for China to join the WTO. 170 It seems unlikely that the drafters of China's
Accession Agreement would omit or fail to report preferential access to loans for
the textile industry when they provide a detailed description of the subsidies provided to the Chinese textile industry and of the sectors of the Chinese economy
that otherwise enjoy preferential access to credit. 17' Also, it does not seem likely
that China's progress toward a market economy necessitates any more trade distorting measures than those already in place. 172 Consequently, preferential access to loans for the Chinese textile industry does not fall under Articles 29.1 and
29.4 of the SCM.
165 Id.art. 29.1.
166 See Accession Agreement, supra note 6, at Annex 5A, 5B.
167 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 29.4.
168

Id.

169 Id.

170 See Rumbaugh & Blancher, supra note 59, at 3.
171 Accession Agreement, supra note 6, at Annex 5A, 5B. One may argue that China may deny that it
provides preferential access to loans for its textile industry, however such claim will be hard to prove
given the existing reports on such subsidization. See 2004 REPORT, supra note 7, at 263. Also, China
will not succeed in showing that preferential access to loans is not a subsidy, since preferential access to
loans falls squarely within the subsidy definition of the SCM. See SCM, supra note 12.
172 See generally Accession Agreement, supra note 6, at Annex 5A, 5B; Wen, supra note 60;
Rumbaugh & Blancher, supra note 59.
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2.

Application of Article 29

Nevertheless, Article 29 will still be applicable because of Article 29.2(b)
which provides: "[w]ith respect to other actionable subsidies, the provisions of
paragraph 9 of Article 27 shall apply."' 173 Article 27.9 requires either that "nullification or impairment of tariff concessions or other obligations under GATT
1994 is found to exist as a result of such a subsidy"' 74 or that the subsidized
imports are causing injury in the industry of the importing country.' 75 The nullification requirement of Article 27.9 is similar to that of Article 5(b) and demands
country showing that the subsidy nullifies or impairs its benefits under
a WTO 76
1
GATT.
Under GATT, Article XXIII addresses nullification or impairment. 177 Article
XXIII allows a WTO country to bring a claim that "any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired" as a
result of China's preferential loan access of its textile industry.1 78 The complaining WTO member "bears the burden of providing a detailed justification for
179
its claim in order to establish a presumption that what is claimed is true."'
According to the WTO Panel in Japan-Film,the complaining party must show
that "the claimed benefit has been that of legitimate expectations of improved
held that a reasonable
market-access opportunities."' 80 Furthermore, the Panel
8
anticipation must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.' '
A country challenging China's subsidy may argue that it reasonably anticipated the elimination of the subsidies provided to the Chinese textile industry.
For its WTO accession, China committed to the elimination of all subsidies and
reported those subsidies that will be phased out during its transition to a market
173 SCM, supra note 12, art. 29.2.
174 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 27.9. Article 27 applies to developing countries. The WTO does not
provide a definition of developed countries. Members announce for themselves whether they are developed or developing countries and other members can challenge such an announcement. See World Trade
Organization, Who are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
devele/dlwhoe.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2006). Arguably, China is a developing country and Article
27 of the SCM might apply as a whole to its subsidies. For our purposes, only Articles 27.9 and 27.13
are relevant. Article 27.13 applies for notified subsidies in the form of direct debt forgiveness and subsidies to cover social costs. See SCM, supra note 12, art. 27.13. Thus, Article 27.13 does not apply to
subsidies in the form of preferential access to loans.
175 SCM, supra note 12, art. 27.9.
176 See id. arts. 5, 27.9.
177 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 1l, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art.

XXIII, http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/gatt47-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2006) [hereinafter
GATT].
178 See GATT, supra note 177.
179 Panel Report, Japan-MeasuresAffecting Consumer PhotographicFilm and Paper, 10.32, WT/
DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratope/dispu e/44r00.pdf [hereinafter Japan-Film]. The United States brought a challenge against the Japanese distribution scheme of
consumer photographic film and paper, which excluded exports from other traditional distribution
channels.
180 Id. 1 10.61.
181 Id. T 10.79.
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economy. 182 Another WTO country could reasonably expect the textile market
to be more accessible after the expiration of all textile quotas, given China's
commitment toward free trade as expressed in the Accession Agreement.
3.

Injury and Causation

A WTO member challenging Chinese textile subsidies in the form of preferential access to loans may have difficulty meeting the causation requirement of
Article XXIII. The challenging country must show that the nullification or impairment of its benefits arises directly from this specific type of subsidy. However, China enjoys a comparative advantage in the production of textiles and has
a defense based on the comparative advantage theory. 183 In other words, China
has the ability to produce and export textiles quickly and at a low cost, which
arguably gives it an advantage in textile production. In addition, China may defend itself by arguing that there are other economic factors that negatively affect
the domestic industry of the complaining country.
In order to meet its burden of proof under Article XXIII, the complaining
country must show that the alleged nullification or impairment directly results
from China's preferential credit treatment of its textile industry. Accordingly, a
complainant must show that the subsidy caused the injury and upset the competitive position of its textiles.1 84 This is a substantial hurdle for a complainant to
overcome because of China's comparative advantage in textiles.
Neither the dominance of Chinese textiles in the world market nor the lack of
competitiveness of textiles from other countries is due to the preferential credit
access of Chinese textile manufacturers. Rather, they are the result of China's
comparative advantage in textiles.1 85 China has the raw materials, the labor
force, the machinery and the shipping ability to produce at low costs, to sell at
low prices and to quickly export large quantities of textiles. 186 Furthermore, the
expiration of the ATC removed all restraints that could have prevented the Chinese textile and apparel industry from exploiting its comparative advantage in
textiles and, eventually, conquering the world textile market. However, if China
responds to an SCM challenge with a defense based on its comparative advantage
in textiles, such a defense will transform the dispute into a debate about the benefits and drawbacks of the free-trade system itself. For this reason, the holding in
Japan-Film,that the remedy of Article XXIII is a very important tool which
182

See generally Accession Agreement, supra note 6.

183

See infra Part IV.A and accompanying notes.

184 See Japan-Film,supra note 179, R 10.82-10.89 & 10.318. The Panel required a causal link
between subsidies provided and nullification or impairment. Id. M 10.82, 10.349. The United States
must show that the upset in the competitive relationship between domestic and imported products are the
direct result of the measure, not because of any effect on trade flows. Id. But the United States did not
meet its burden of proof. Id.
185 See ifra Part IV.A.
186
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should "be approached with caution and should remain as an exceptional remedy,"' 87 becomes relevant to an SCM action against Chinese textiles.
In addition, the second prong of Article 27.9 requires a showing of injury to
the domestic industry, thus, there must be a causal link between subsidized imports and the alleged injury.1 88 Article 15.5 explains: "It must be demonstrated
that the subsidized imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing injury
within the meaning of this Agreement."' 89 The impact of subsidized textile imports upon the domestic textile industry of the complaining country will be examined in light of "all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on
the state of the industry."1 90 Other factors that can have an adverse effect on the
domestic textile industry of a member country must also be considered.' 9 ' Article 15.5 states that the injury caused to the domestic industry from factors other
be taken into account in assessing the
than the subsidized textiles should 1not
92
injury caused by the textile subsidy.
The causation requirement of Article 15 of the SCM may provide China with
grounds to defend itself against a possible challenge. Article 15 specifies that a
challenging country must show that it is the subsidization of Chinese textiles that
gives Chinese textile goods an advantage over domestic products, and that with93
out subsidization, textiles from China would not injure the domestic market.'
China, however, may argue in response that the challenging country's textile sector is shrinking and has been generally unhealthy for the past few years. For
example, in a potential challenge from the United States, China may show that
the domestic industry is shrinking due to factors other than increased imports of
Chinese textiles.' 94 Available data shows that the U.S. textile industry is in poor
health due to loss of employment, plant closings and over-dependency upon foreign sources for critical textile-related materials or textile imports from other
countries. 19 5 Based upon Article 15 of the SCM, a showing from China that
there are other economic factors affecting the state of the U.S. textile industry
179, 10.30.
SCM, supra note 12, arts. 15.5 & 27.9.

187 Japan-Film,supra note
188

189 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 15.5; see also Panel Report, United States-Investigation of the
InternationalTrade Commission in Softwood Lumberfrom Canada,WT/DS277/R (Mar. 22, 2004) avail-

able at http://www.worldlii.org/int/casesrWTOP/2004/1.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (finding that a
threat determination should be made against the background of an evaluation of the condition of the
industry in light of the factors in Articles 3.4 and 15.4).
190 SCM, supra note 12, art. 15.4 (noting that "[tlhe examination of the impact of the subsidized
imports on the domestic industry shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry").
191 Id. (noting that the list provided in Article 15.4 is not exhaustive).
192 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 15.5 (stating the standard for an injury determination under the
SCM).
193 See id.
194 See id.
195

See

THE

U.S.

TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRIES:

INDUSTRIAL

BASE ASSESSMENT, REPORT TO

Oct. 2003, http://www.bxa.doc.gov/DefenseIndustrialBasePrograms/
OSIES/DefMarketResearchRpts/TextileExecSum03.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (stating that the U.S.
textile industry has declined over the past few years due to loss of employment, plant closing and dependence of foreign materials) (last visited Apr. 28, 2005); US Home Textile Imports in January-July 2005:
CONGRESS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
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would disprove U.S. claims that the Chinese textile subsidies caused injury to the
U.S. textiles sector. 196 Consequently, based on the data available, China may
successfully defend its textiles against an alleged injury to the U.S. textile
industry.
Moreover, under Article 15 of the SCM, China may invoke its comparative
advantage in textiles as a defense. Because of its ability to produce and export
textiles quickly and at a low cost, China has a comparative advantage in textiles
197
that, after the elimination of all textile quotas, operates without restrictions.
Based on the theory of comparative advantage, countries will produce what they
are best at producing. It flows, then, that since China is currently best at producing textiles, it will export the largest number of textiles and the U.S. textile industry will shrink. 198 Thus, the injury alleged is not the result of subsidies but the
result of comparative advantage. Because the comparative advantage theory is
the basic principle underlying the WTO system, 199 a potential Chinese defense
based on the comparative advantage principle will constitute a significant challenge for the opposite party and for the free-trade system itself.
Remedies and their Implications

4.

Nevertheless, if a complaining country overcomes the hurdles of Article 29
and successfully shows nullification or impairment, it may then utilize the remedies provided under Article 7 of the SCM Agreement. 200 A country alleging that
the Chinese textile subsidies injure its domestic industry may request consultations with China. 20 ' However, if consultations do not bring about a mutually
20 2
desired solution, the parties can refer their dispute to the DSB for resolution.
If the WTO dispute settlement process determines that the subsidy resulted in an
adverse effect, China would then have six months to withdraw the subsidy or
remove its adverse effects. 20 3 Otherwise, in the absence of a compensation
country can impose countervailing measures to Chiagreement, the complaining
20 4
apparel.
and
textiles
nese
China vs. India and Pakistan, available at http://www.emergingtextiles.com/?q=com&s=login&rqART=
050929Amark&r=usimports (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
196 See SCM, supra note 12, art. 15.4.
197 See infra Part V.A.
198 See Barboza & Becker supra note 1; Business Report, Chinese Exports Threaten to Destroy Textile and Manufacturing Industries Worldwide (Jan. 19, 2005), available at http://www.tralac.org/scripts/
content.php?id=3321 (last visited Apr. 26, 2005); Fong Mei Fong, Backlash is Likely as Chinese Exports
of Apparel Surge, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2005, at A3.
199 See Understanding the WTO, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
200 SCM, supra note 12, arts. 29 & 7 (stating the remedies available to a WTO member that successfully shows a violation of the SCM Agreement by another member).
201

Id.

202 Id.
203

Id.

204 Id.
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In addition, the SCM Agreement allows for the imposition of provisional measures. 20 5 According to Article 17, a WTO member can impose provisional countervailing duties against Chinese textiles when there has been a preliminary
affirmative determination that a subsidy exists and causes injury to its domestic
textile industry. 20 6 Such provisional measures cannot exceed four months. 20 7
However, the complainant must keep in mind that an action can only be
brought in relation to "like products. ' '208 The Panel in Indonesia-Autos addressed the issue of "likeness" in examining whether government subsidies to
Indonesian automobile manufacturers displaced imports of like passenger cars
from the Indonesian market within the meaning of Article 6.3.209 The Panel
referred to interpretations of "like products" in other provisions of the WTO
Agreement and held that likeness should be assessed in terms of the products'
physical and non-physical characteristics. 2 10 The likeness requirement may be
significant considering China's position as a primary producer of the world's
textiles. 2 11 Countries with smaller textile industries may not be able to show
injury if they do not produce like products themselves. Furthermore, because
WTO members cannot bring actions on behalf of other WTO countries, 212 the
number of countries that could invoke the SCM provisions is limited by a country's own capacity in the production of textiles.
Nonetheless, one could argue that once a single country brings a successful
SCM complaint against Chinese textile subsidies, there would be a spill over
effect to the rest of the countries affected by Chinese textile exports. A WTO
ruling that China is in violation of its obligations under the SCM Agreement
would potentially force China to lift the subsidies, consequently producing a multilateral benefit as all of China's trading partners would benefit by their elimination. But, if China does not eliminate the subsidies, it would be subject to
unilateral retaliatory measures, which may only benefit the challenging country's
industry. Given China's current transition to a market economy, 2 13 a lifting of
the textiles subsidies at this stage might be premature, hard to implement or otherwise unlikely. Therefore, if a successful SCM challenge is brought in the
WTO against China's textiles, it is likely that the only remedy available to the
challenger will be retaliation.
205 Id. art. 17 (stating that provisional CVD measures are available to WTO members and providing
the procedures for their implementation).

206

Id.

207

Id.

208

Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Report of the Panel, W/T/

DS54,55,59,64/R,
209
210

14.163-14.204 (July 2, 1998).

Id.
Id.

211 Trade Policy Monitor: The Downside of PRC WTO Accession: Textiles & Clothing, available at
http://www.thunderlake.com/prc-tandc.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2005) (stating that China is the world's
largest exporter of textiles and apparel products).
212 See SCM, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
213 See TAO & O'BRIEN, supra note 59.
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Despite the significant limitations on their invocation, 2 14 countervailing duties
imposed under the SCM provisions have advantages in comparison to the measures available under the China Accession Agreement. 2 15 Under the SCM, a
WTO member does not need to reapply every year in order to impose countervailing measures to subsidized Chinese textiles. 21 6 In addition, it can apply provisional measures while pending elimination of the subsidy or determination by
the DSB. 2 17 It is more likely that China will be more responsive to countervailing duties imposed under the SCM than to measures imposed under its Accession Agreement, because of economic costs and legitimacy reasons. An
official WTO recognition that the flood of subsidized Chinese textiles poses a
problem to the world markets, coupled with a negative finding by the DSB,
would exert pressure on China to reconsider its foreign trade policy and legitimize its means. 21 8 An elimination of the Chinese textiles subsidies would benefit
all its trading partners. Consequently, if a country successfully overcomes the
hurdles of invoking the SCM Agreement, the SCM may provide a more compelling and multilateral solution to the problem of Chinese textiles than the unilateral remedies provided in China's WTO Accession Agreement.
IV. China's Textiles, their Comparative Advantage, and the Evolution of
International Trade
The termination of all textile quotas constitutes a significant challenge for the
WTO because of the Chinese comparative advantage in textiles. WTO members
fear that the Chinese textile industry is going to grow at their expense and are
examining ways to slow down the Chinese expansion in the global textile market.21 9 Part III demonstrated that despite some hurdles, it is possible that WTO
members could invoke the provisions of the SCM to impose countervailing duties to textiles from China. However, a possible invocation of the SCM at this
stage may be premature and harmful to the free-trade system itself. The expiration of the quota system in textiles requires a period of adjustment within the
textile industry. While WTO members have legitimate concerns about the health
of their domestic textile industries, they should not overlook the existence of an
evolution in international trade. It is exactly this evolutionary process that they
consented to when they joined the WTO. Efforts to stop the market adjustments
214 See supra, Part Ifl.B.
215 Similar to the SCM, the Accession Agreement may be applied to like products and after an evaluation of all objective relevant factors regarding the effect of the imports at issue on the domestic industry
producing like products. Accession Agreement, supra note 6, art. 16.4.
216 SCM, supra note 12, art. 21 (stating the SCM provisions regarding the duration and review of the

imposed CVD measures).
217 Id. art. 17. However, the Accession Agreement provides for stronger provisional measures that the
SCM. Article 15 specifically states that provisional measures can last up to 200 days, which far exceeds
that four month limit on SCM provisional measures. See Accession Agreement, supra note 6, art. 16.
218 Claire Kelly, The Value Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 705, 705-07 (2001) (explaining that the WTO, viewed either as a selfenforcing or legalized regime, can impose costs to its members for non-compliance either in terms of
economic sanctions or of legitimacy).
219 Id.
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following the ATC expiration may nullify the role of comparative advantage in
the WTO framework and, consequently, undermine the free-trade system itself.
A.

China's Comparative Advantage in Textiles

China is an enormous and fast-growing economy with a comparative advantage in the production of apparel and textiles. China's comparative advantage in
the production of textiles and apparel can be traced to several factors: low wage
rates, 220 large labor supply, 22 1 more productive workforce, 222 benefits from economies of scale, 22 3 industrial base, 224 geographic location, 22 5 and heavy investment in infrastructure.2 26 Undoubtedly, its comparative advantage in textiles
makes China one of the biggest textile industries and one of the leading world
exporters. 227 China has the raw materials, the workers, the machinery, and the
shipping ability to produce at low cost, to sell at low prices and to distribute
quickly large quantities of textiles to other markets. 22 8 In addition, many global
clothing companies transfer their manufacturing facilities229to China because of the
availability of low-cost labor and production materials.
Even though China's status in the global textiles market is to a degree attributable to the subsidization of its textile industry, its comparative advantage is not.
Arguably, because of China's vast resources, its comparative advantage in textiles would exist even if no subsidization were in place. 230 Alternatively, even if
subsidization helps the Chinese textile industry, one cannot attribute China's
comparative advantage exclusively to the textile subsidies. To say that subsidies
have caused China's comparative advantage in textiles would ignore the presence
of other important economic factors (like cheap labor, large labor supply, labor
220 THE AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, THE CHINA THREAT TO THE WORLD TEX-

12 (2005); Linda Lim, China Shows the Way in a Quota-FreeMarket (Feb.
23, 2005), available at http://www.efu.com.cn/eng/onllinesales/promotion/allround/2005-2-23/7886.htm
TILE AND APPAREL TRADE

(last visited Apr. 25, 2005); Jonathan Steiman, Expirationof Textile Quota Act Takes Toll on U.S. Manu-

facturers (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://pf.inc.com/criticalnews/articles/200501/textiles.html (last
visited Apr. 24, 2005) (noting that American textile makers cannot compete with the wages in China,
"where the wages run as low as 41 cents per hour").
221 Id.

Id.
Chinese factories benefit from economies of scale, given the large production base and domestic
market afforded by the country's huge population. See Lim, supra note 220 and accompanying text.
224 China's large, diverse, and increasingly integrated industrial base means that many materials required to make clothing are locally available, avoiding the added costs, risks, and longer delivery leadtimes that imported inputs impose on other countries. Id.
-- 225 China's geographic location, close to Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, allows it to readily
import advanced equipment and high-tech textiles for its finishing industries. Id.
226 China has also invested heavily in its physical infrastructure, allowing speed of delivery of both
imports and exports. Id.
227 See Business Report, supra note 198.
228 Id.; David J. Lynch, As Quotas End, China Stands Ready to Be Clothing Giant (Dec. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2004-12-21-china-textilesx.htm.
229 Rebecca Buckman, Navigating China's Textile Trade, WALL ST. J., Sept 10, 2004, at A10.
222

223

230

Id.
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productivity, etc.), and thus would be an incomplete assessment of China's com231
parative advantage in textiles.
Because of its comparative advantage in the production of textiles and apparel,
China has the ability to take over the world textile market. 232 According to the
comparative advantage theory, it is a "natural consequence" of free trade that
China will hold a dominant position in the textiles trade and that textiles from
China will take over the world market.2 33 The surge in exports from China and
the flood of Chinese textiles in the world market after the expiration of the
ATC2 34 are the effects of China's comparative advantage in textiles.
B. China's Dominance in Textiles as Part of the Evolution of International
Trade
Confronted with China's supremacy in textiles and apparel, WTO members
have legitimate concerns with regard to the future of their own domestic industries. Both developed and developing countries fear that their domestic textile
industries will either shrink or disappear. 235 Most countries are currently exper236
iencing loss of domestic jobs and loss of domestic and foreign market-share.
Countries, like the United States, experience great pressure from their textile industry representatives to impose safeguard measures to stop the Chinese textile
237
import surge.
Concerns about China's trade practices further accentuate the fears of WTO
countries about the decline of their domestic textile industries. Until recently,
China heavily subsidized its textile industry. 2 38 Commentators argue that it still
does. 239 Concerns about subsidization do not seem unreasonable given that
China is not a full market economy yet,2 40 not all of its industries are completely
independent of government control,24 1 its currency and banking practices are
questionable, 242 and transparency in transactions is open to discussion. 24 3 Some
commentators go even further and argue that the comparative advantage of Chi231

Id.

232 See Business Report, supra note 198.
233 Supra, Part I.A.
234 Id.

235 See generally Sjoberg & Moore, supra note 4; see also GATT, supra note 4; see Pruzin &
Rugaber, supra note 5.
236 2004 REPORT, supra note 7.
237 Fong Mei Fong, Pressure Grows to Curb Chinese Textiles, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2005, at A12.
238 See Accession Agreement, supra note 6, at 90.
239 See 2004 REPORT, supra note 7 and accompanying text; China's WTO Record: A Two-Year Assessment, Testimony Before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Trade Policy Stuff Committee (2003)
(statement of Myron A. Brilliant, Vice President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Asia)).
240 See Accession Agreement, supra note 6, sec. 15 (stating that other WTO members can treat China
as a non-market economy in dumping and subsidy cases for fifteen years after its entry).
241 See ATC, supra note 3 (referring to Chinese banks and "thousands" of state-owned companies).
242 Id. (Noting among others that Chinese "major banks aren't banks so much as financing arms of
the government" and that there is corruption in the financial system).
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nese textiles is nothing more than the heavy
subsidization by the Chinese govern2 44
ment of the country's textile industry.
Nonetheless, this is exactly what comparative advantage theory predicts or
presupposes for the full benefits of free trade. Comparative advantage predicts
that production shifts to those who can produce with the least cost.24 5 When
comparative advantage works, some industries prosper while others die. 246 Production will shift to those countries that can produce at lower costs and as a result
those countries' exports will increase. The WTO framework is based on this
for its members to achieve economic growth
very principle of market functioning
247
and prosperity from free trade.

C. The Implications of Invoking the SCM Agreement Against Chinese
Textiles for the WTO Trade System
Increased Chinese textile exports do not necessarily have primarily negative
consequences. Although the Chinese dominance in the production of textiles will
worry countries with "endangered" (i.e. small) textile industries, it does not mean
that the implications of China's dominance in textiles are necessarily negative.
24 8
Consumers benefit from cheaper clothes because of lower production costs.
Moreover, commentators argue that it was the existence of quotas that created the
textile industries in some developing countries and, thus, it is normal for those
industries to disappear once the quotas vanish. 249 In addition, some argue that
countries with special advantages, including
there can still be some developing
250
bilateral textile agreements.
The concerns surrounding the expiration of the ATC are not new. WTO countries anticipated that the expiration of the quota system in textiles would cause an
243 Id., China's WTO Record: A Two-Year Assessment, Testimony Before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Trade Policy Stuff Committee (2003) (statement of Myron A. Brilliant, Vice President of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (Asia)).
244 THE AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, supra note 220, at 12 (2005) (arguing that
China has an enormous advantage in textiles because of its subsidies not because of its cheap labor);
Jonathan Steiman, Expiration of Textile Quota Act Takes Toll on U.S. Manufacturers (Jan. 13, 2005),
http://pf.inc.com/criticalnews/articles/20050l/textiles.html (quoting Lloyd Wood, spokesman for the
American Manufacturing Trade Coalition, who says that "it's subsidies that's really getting China the
market share").
245 See supra Part II.A.
246 Joel R. Paul, Do InternationalTrade Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth and Development, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 285, 300 (2003) (stating that "when comparative advantage works, it necessarily
means that some industries prosper while others die. In a free market, 'creative destruction' through
competition ensures that productive resources shift to their highest and best use").
247 See Understanding the WTO, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
248 See Lim, supra note 220 (discussing that "some developing countries may also have special advantages that set them apart of the competition" and gives the example of Cambodia, Mexico and several
African and Caribbean countries).
249 Id.; see also An End to Global Textile Quotas: Watch China Sew Up the Market, available at
http://knowledge.emory.edu/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=856 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
250 See Lim, supra note 220.
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adjustment in the textile markets and the textile industries.2 5 1 Such adjustment is
taking place now: some market shares increase and others decrease, certain domestic industries shrink and others expand.2 52 WTO countries needed fifteen
years of extensive negotiations with China before accepting it as a full WTO
member. 253 One of the primary issues during those negotiations was China's
comparative advantage in textiles.2 5 4 It is not a new development for the WTO
that China holds a dominant position in the textile sector or that it is an enormous
and fast-growing economy.2 55 Likewise, it is not news that the Chinese economy
is currently undergoing significant changes in order to transform to a market
economy and that it still has some subsidization mechanisms in place. 256 WTO
members have long been aware of China's comparative advantage in the textile
industry and their concerns were addressed
in the special safeguard provisions of
2 57
the China Accession Agreement.
The reaction of the WTO to the current evolution in the global textiles market
has a strong signaling effect regarding the strengths and weaknesses, and the
benefits and drawbacks of the WTO framework. The developments in the international textiles trade resulting from the operation of the comparative advantage
principle seem overwhelming to many countries and there is a significant risk
that the speculation following the expiration of the ATC will spur protectionist
pressures. 25 8 However, by joining the WTO, members consented to the operation of the comparative advantage principle. They even made sure that China's
Accession Agreement would provide enough safeguards to address potential import surges. Using SCM in addition to the provisions of the China Accession
Agreement against Chinese textiles can only be a protectionist sign with negative
259
implications and should not be used against Chinese textiles at this stage.
Invoking the SCM agreement for further protection of WTO countries' domestic textile industries from Chinese textiles would impair the free-trade system. In
defense of its textiles, China may argue that Chinese textiles displace other countries textiles not because of the subsidies, but because of its comparative advan251 Godfrey Yeung & Vincent Mok, Does WTO Accession Matterfor the Chinese Textile and Clothing Industry, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. OF ECON. 937 (2004).
252 Business Report, supra note 198 and accompanying text.
253

Yeung & Mok supra note 250, at 937.

Id. at 938 (stating that China is the largest producer and exporter of textiles since 1995 and its
accession to the WTO would have tremendous implications for the development of the textile industry
globally).
255 Id.
254

256

See Accession Agreement, supra note 6 and accompanying text.

257

See supra Part II.C.

258 See generally Sjoberg & Moore, supra note 4; see also GATT, supra note 4; Pruzin & Rugaber,
supra note 5.
259 See China Hails WTO's End to Textile Quotas from 2005 (29/9/04), http://www.china-embassy.
org/eng/gyzg/tl62891.htm (noting that replacing quotas with new forms of protectionist measures would
negatively affect broader cooperation among WTO members, the next round of WTO trade talks and
China's fulfillment of its obligations).
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tage.2 60 If comparative advantage theory and its effects become the question in
an SCM dispute, the entire WTO free-trade system would come into question
26 1
because the comparative advantage principle lies at the heart of the WTO.
The DSB would become a forum of intense debate about the advantages and
disadvantages of comparative advantage, and thus of free trade. The very possibility that arguments against the free-trade system will arise in the dispute process will discredit not only the dispute settlement process, but also the entire
WTO legal framework.
Furthermore, using the SCM provisions against Chinese textile subsidies, despite the WTO policy concerns in support of member economies in transition,
may create more problems than it would resolve. Articles 27 and 29 express the
WTO's policy of providing flexibility and support to its members in the process
of transformation to market economies. 2 62 Even though these Articles provide
for the imposition of SCM remedies to Chinese textile subsidies in the form of
preferential access to loans, it may be hard to impose such remedies without
undermining their underlying policy objectives. In addition, a potential use of
Article 29 for SCM measures against Chinese subsidies may have a spill over
263 It
effect to subsidies of other non-market economies by creating a precedent.
is likely that a series of new disputes under Article 29, inspired by a successful
application of the SCM against Chinese textiles, would discredit WTO's policy
in support of member economies in transition, would invite criticism of the benefits of joining the free-trade system, and consequently, would undermine the
WTO system.
The Accession Agreement more appropriately responds to the current situation
in the world textile market than the SCM. WTO countries can place safeguards
on the products that cause injury to their domestic textile industry without the
risk of undermining the entire WTO free-trade system. The SCM Agreement
could potentially offer a better solution if China was a full-market economy or if
likeness of products could be more easily ascertainable. At the present stage,
neither of these qualifications can be met: China's transition from a non-market
to a market economy needs time to be completed despite the steps already taken
in that direction; and since most textile production is already taking place in
China, it might be difficult for a country to show that it has like products produced domestically and not imported from third countries as required in order to
invoke the SCM.
Consequently, an SCM challenge may bring into question the operation of the
comparative advantage principle, thus, raising doubts about the efficacy of the
free-trade system itself. Therefore, instead of stopping China's textile domi260 China's comparative advantage is distinguishable from the potential effect of the subsidies to its
textile industry. It might have helped the Chinese textile industry that subsidies were in place, however,
China's comparative advantage does not flow from its subsidization but from its vast resources. See
supra Part III.A., B.
261 See Understanding the WTO, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
262

See supra Part II.A.2.

263

See Quinn, supra note 133 (noting the lack of WTO jurisprudence on SCM Article 29).
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nance, invoking the SCM in addition to the provision of the Accession Agreement against Chinese textile imports may endanger the WTO system itself.
V.

Conclusion

China has a comparative advantage in the production of textiles and is the
world's largest textile exporter. Consequently, China has a competitive edge in
the textile industry following the elimination of all textile quotas with the expiration of the ATC. WTO countries, faced with the prospect of a Chinese dominance in textile markets, have legitimate concerns about the future of their
domestic textiles industries and look to the WTO framework for solutions.
China's Accession Agreement provides safeguard mechanisms which WTO
countries may use to respond effectively to Chinese textile export surges. At this
stage, invoking the provisions of the SCM to slow down Chinese textile exports,
however effective, would be in addition to the provisions of the Accession
Agreement, would discredit WTO policy concerns with respect to members with
economies in transition, and would infringe on the operation of comparative advantage in the textiles market, thereby undermining the WTO free-trade system.
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